کاربرد نظریه بازی‌ها در حل مناقشه آبی حوضه دریاچه ارومیه

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکترای مهندسی منابع آب، گروه مهندسی آب، دانشکده کشاورزی، دانشگاه ارومیه

2 استاد گروه مهندسی آب، دانشکده کشاورزی، دانشگاه ارومیه

چکیده

تاکنون تحقیقات مختلفی در مورد علل خشکی دریاچه و راه‌های احیای این ثروت ملی انجام شده است. در این تحقیق با استفاده از نظریه بازی‌ها و تعریف پنج سناریو، مناقشه آبی حوضه دریاچه ارومیه برای سال آبی 95-94 مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است. بدین منظور، درآمد بخش کشاورزی و آبی که به دریاچه می‌ریزد، به‌عنوان دو بازیکن معرفی شدند. در این بازی غیر همکارانه، حوضه اجازه برداشت بیش از 100% از منابع آب تجدید پذیر طبیعی خود را نداشته و حداقل 3.5 میلیارد مترمکعب آب به دریاچه تخصیص داده شده است. علاوه بر این، این‌گونه فرض شد که درآمد بخش کشاورزی، نباید از درآمد فعلی آن در سال آبی موردمطالعه کمتر شود. بر مبنای فرضیات فوق، سناریو 4 که در آن زراعت آبی حذف شده و کل مساحت اراضی زراعی به کشت دیم اختصاص یافته و علاوه بر آن کل مساحت باغات آبی تحت پوشش آبیاری قطره‌ای قرار گرفته است، نتایج مطلوب‌تری نسبت به بقیه سناریوها در پی داشت. در نقطه تعادل محاسبه‌شده در سناریو 4، حوضه با مصرف26.78% از آب تجدید پذیر طبیعی خود برای مصارف کشاورزی، شرب و صنعت، 4235 میلیون مترمکعب آب به دریاچه تخصیص داده است. علاوه بر این درآمد بخش کشاورزی نیز در نقطه تعادل محاسبه‌شده، 19% بیشتر از حالت فعلی بوده است. در این نقطه تعادل، به دلیل حذف زراعت آبی، هزینه‌های جاری کاهش یافته و می‌تواند با اقبال عمومی از جانب کشاورزان روبرو شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Application of Game Theory, In Order to Conciliate Urmia Lake Basin Water Conflict

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mostafa Banitalebi Dehkordi 1
  • Hossein Rezaie 2
1 Ph. D student of Water Resources Engineering, Dept. of Water Engineering, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Urmia, Urmia, Iran.
2 Prof. Dept. of Water Engineering, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Urmia, Urmia, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Several researches have been performed to investigate reasons of Urmia Lake dry out and solutions to stop Lake Shrinkage. In this research, by means of game theory and establishing five different scenarios, the Urmia Lake Conflict, has been discussed. Therefore, income of agriculture sector and water which is discharged to lake, are introduced as two players. In this non-cooperative game, the basin consumers sector was not allowed to consume more than 100% of Natural Renewable Water Resources and at least 3.5 billion cubic meters of water was allocated to Lake. Moreover, another hypothesis was that Agricultural Income should not be less than current amount. Based on above limitations, compared to other scenarios, the 4th scenario, in which, irrigated cropping pattern was completely prohibited and all orchards were irrigated using drip irrigation, presented the most desirable results. In the equilibrium, which was located at 4th scenario, Agricultural, Domestic and Industry sectors, consumed 26.78% of natural renewable water and 4235 mcm of water was allocated to Lake. Moreover, the agricultural income in this equilibrium was increased by 19% compared to current situation. At the equilibrium, as a consequence of crop irrigation prohibition, current costs diminished and therefore it might be in interest of farmers more than other scenarios.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Renewable Water Resources
  • Urmia Lake Basin
  • Scenario
  • Game Theory
  • Equilibrium

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دانش آب و خاک
دوره 32، شماره 4
دی 1401
صفحه 147-168

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