بهینه‏سازی پایدار الگوی کشت با استفاده از تئوری بازی با پرداخت جانبی (مطالعه موردی: دشت ارومیه-حوضه آبریز دریاچه ارومیه)

نویسندگان

1 گروه مهندسی آب، دانشگاه ارومیه، ارومیه، ایران

2 گروه مهندسی آب، دانشکده کشاورزی، دانشگاه ارومیه

چکیده

در این مطالعه عملکرد بازی رقابتی، مشارکتی ومشارکتی با پرداخت جانبی در تحلیل تضاد منافع محیط زیست و بهره‌برداران منابع آبی مورد ارزیابی قرار ‏گرفت. در بازی رقابتی، بازیکنان با هدف به حداکثر رساندن پی‏آمد انفرادی خود و در رقابت با یکدیگر تصمیم‏ گیری می‏نمایند. اما در بازی مشارکتی، هدف بازیکنان به حداکثر رساندن مجموع مطلوبیت هردو بازیکن است که این مطلوبیت، بیشینه درآمد واحد سطح برای کشاورزان و کمینه نیاز آبی واحد سطح برای محیط زیست می‏باشد. اما کشاورزان به منافع انفرادی خود اهمیت بیشتری قائل بوده و تمایل بیشتری به بازی رقابتی دارند. پرداخت جانبی به‏عنوان یک تکنیک موثر، با انتقال مقداری از منافع بین بازیکنان، میزان منفعت انفرادی بازیکنان را در دو شرایط مشارکتی و رقابتی برابر می‏نماید. در چنین شرایطی، امکان جلب موافقت بهره بردار آب کشاورزی برای اجرای الگوی کشت مطلوب محیط زیست فراهم می‏گردد. در این مطالعه، شرایط تقابل بین منافع اقتصادی بخش کشاورزی و ملاحظات زیست محیطی اکوسیستم دریاچه ارومیه در دشت ارومیه با استفاده از تئوری بازی‏ها مورد ارزیابی قرار گرفته است. بر اساس نتایج، مقدار نیاز آبی الگوی کشت بهینه و مقدار درآمد واحد سطح (هکتار) به‏ترتیب، در بازی رقابتی برابر 4788 مترمکعب و 24/21 میلیون تومان و در بازی مشارکتی معادل 3492 مترمکعب و 97/19 میلیون تومان شد. لذا با پرداخت جانبی برابر 37/1 میلیون تومان در هکتار، ترغیب کشاورز به اجرای الگوی بهینه مشارکتی و صرفه جویی 69/24 درصدی آب نسبت به وضع موجود فراهم گردید.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Sustainable Optimization of Crop Pattern using Game Theory with Side-Payment (Case Study: Urmia Plane, Urmia Lake Basin)

نویسندگان [English]

  • Javid Rahimi Golenji 1
  • Majid Montaseri 2
1 Department of Water Engineering, Urmia University, Urmia, Iran
2 Urmia University
چکیده [English]

In this study, the performance of the competitive and cooperative game and side-payment technique in the analysis of the conflict of interest of environment and water resources users was evaluated. In a competitive game, the players decide to compete with each other in order to maximize their individual payoff. But in a cooperative game, the goal of the players is to maximize the total utility of both players that, this desirability is the maximum income per unit area for farmers and the minimum water demand per unit area for the environment. But farmers care more about their individual benefits and are more interested in competitive game. As an effective technique, side-payment, by transferring some of the benefits between the players, equalizes the individual benefits of the players in both cooperative and competitive conditions. In such circumstances, it is possible to obtain the consent of the agricultural water consumers to implement the desired environmental cropping pattern. In this study, the conditions of conflict between the economic interests of the agricultural sector and the environmental considerations of the Urmia Lake ecosystem in the Urmia plain with the independence of game theory innovatively evaluated. Based on the results, the amount of water demand of the optimal cultivation pattern and the amount of income per unit area (hectare) in the competitive and cooperative game are 4788 cubic meters and 21.24 million Tomans and 3492 cubic meters and 19.97 million Tomans, respectively.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • game theory
  • Competitive game
  • Cooperative game
  • Nash equilibria
  • Side-Payment
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